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Abstract—Location-based Services (LBS) have gained popular-
ity as a result of the advances in mobile and communication tech-
nologies. LBS provide users with relevant information based on
their location. In spite of the desirable features provided by LBS,
the geographic location of users are not adequately protected.
Location privacy is one of the major challenges in vehicular and
mobile networks. In this article, we analyse the security and
privacy requirements for LBS in vehicular and mobile networks.
Specifically, this paper covers privacy enhancing technologies
and cryptographic approaches that provide location privacy
in vehicular and mobile networks. The different approaches
proposed in literature are compared and open research areas
are identified.
Index Terms—Privacy, Authentication, Location-based ser-
vices, Vehicular ad hoc networks, Mobile technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many years of advances in mobile and wireless network
technologies have ushered in a variety of application domains
of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) resulting in disrup-
tive changes to the way we live, work, and play. Examples
of the applications of VANET technology abound including
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITSs), Connected Autonomous
Cars (CACs), and Internet of Things (IoT) such as Internet
of Vehicles (IoVs) [1], [2], [3]. These application domains
such as ITSs, IoVs, and CACs have attracted a great deal of
attention in recent years both in the academia and industries
[1], [2]. The key feature of these application domains is that
vehicles fitted with multiple sensors can collect various forms
of data including the location information of drivers which
can be analysed and exchanged with vehicles for various
purposes including road safety, traffic management and user
convenience [3], [4]. In the near future, it is expected that
millions of vehicles will be connected through a complex
vehicular network infrastructure to form IoVs using various
technologies, both in industrial and domestic contexts [5], [6],
[1], [7]. VANETs for ITS are characterised by dynamic mo-
bility patterns, infrequent connectivity, and frequent topology
changes in addition to the somewhat hostile environments in
which wireless networks are deployed.
According to [8], IoT is not only being widely leveraged
for smart parking solutions and traffic management but also
for the entertainment of passengers, telematics solutions and
fleet management. It is envisioned that IoT will help in the
advancement of transportation management systems including
electronic toll collections. The rapid acceptance and adoption
of ‘smart city‘ revolution by more cities in recent years has
paved way for the continuous innovation towards improved
standard of living in which ITS plays a vital role. IoT
plays a key role in the integration, control and processing
of information across transportation systems thereby creating
real-time interactions [7] [9].
In addition to security threats specific to wireless networks,
due to the location information embedded in exchanged mes-
sages, some location privacy threats to users/drivers exist too
[2]. For instance, a malicious vehicle can track a driver for
social profiling based on the location information contained
in the exchanged safety messages. Malicious vehicles can also
lie about their location information to deceive rescue workers
in emergencies in order to evade prosecution in hit-and-run
accidents [10], [9]. In emergency and rescue situations, accu-
rate location information is needed to correctly direct rescue
workers and the police for efficient emergency evacuation. A
major threat to location privacy is the possibility of a location
privacy attacker (PA) revealing the real identity of vehicles and
their users using tracking algorithms which may expose users
to social profiling. Malicious vehicles can also use location
information to stalk other road users and reveal their personal
identity (breach of identity privacy). Of course, the close-
knit relationship between vehicle drivers and their vehicles
implies that tracking vehicles is as good as tracking/following
its driver’s whereabouts.
A. Security and Privacy in Location-Based Services
In the context of location-based services in IoT, security
and privacy threats related to location-based services have
not been adequately addressed. IoT is not only an emerg-
ing technology, it is expected that several applications areas
including manufacturing, healthcare and transportation will
benefit from IoT systems [11]. In vehicular networks, IoT can
be combined with cloud computing as an infrastructure service
for vehicular cloud data. This is useful for disseminating
information related to transportation such as monitoring road
conditions tracking the location of the vehicle in real time and
traffic control management. In recent years, the authors in [12],
[13], [14], [15] have proposed solutions aimed at improving
the Intelligent Transport System (ITS) using IoT technologies.
For example, the Intelligent Internet of Vehicles Systems
(IIOVMS) proposed in [12] for the collection of traffic related
information from external environments. In [13], a cloud
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architecture that combines IoT technology with a middleware
is developed to enable innovation in automobile technologies.
In [14], the authors develop an intelligent monitoring system to
track the location of refrigerator trucks using IoT technologies.
In [15], the authors develop a cloud enabling platform which
is combined with IoT as an enabling infrastructure to support
transport-related information including vehicle location track-
ing and monitoring.
B. Relation to Existing Surveys
Several authors have surveyed the various approaches to
security and privacy in IoT systems [16] [17],[18]. In [16],
the authors provide an in-depth evaluation of threats and their
countermeasures for Global Navigation Satellite System and
Non-GNSS systems. They survey a wide range of security
and privacy solutions based on localisation and positioning
in the IoT systems. They also give an insight on the legal
and technical requirements for localisation and positioning in
IoT systems. In [18], the authors present a comprehensive
overview of enabling technologies in IoT, architectures as well
as security and privacy related issues. In addition, fog/edge
computing based on IoT is introduced and the authors clearly
distinguish between IoT and cyber-physical systems. The
roadmap from vehicular networks to smart transportation looks
promising. While vehicular network architecture supports spe-
cific applications such as safety and traffic efficiency, internet
connectivity may not be fully available. With the support of
IoT systems, it is envisaged that convergent evolution of IP and
mobile networks will provide a common infrastructure for a
broad set of applications. In vehicular networks the authors
in [19], provide a detailed survey of authentication schemes
and outline some privacy preserving schemes.They examine
and categorise proposed solutions based on their suitability
for various conditions. The authors in [20] pay attention to
pseudonym schemes proposed for vehicular networks. Their
survey covers pseudonym schemes based on cryptographic
approaches such as public key and identity-based cryptography
as well as symmetric authentication schemes. In contrast, this
paper surveys research that is relevant to location privacy
in mobile and vehicular networks. We specifically provide
a detailed analysis of existing privacy enhancing schemes,
cryptographic approaches and privacy preserving authentica-
tion schemes proposed for location privacy in vehicular and
mobile networks. Furthermore, we address the open issues
and challenges in security and location privacy in vehicular
networks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section II,
we describe the security and privacy requirements for vehicular
and mobile networks. In section III, we present the adversary
models, location privacy metrics and attacks discussed in
literature. In section IV, we discuss the existing location
privacy/security schemes in mobile vehicular networks. We
distinguish four major categories of location privacy enhancing
schemes and also discuss privacy preserving authentication
schemes. In section V, we discuss privacy enhancing schemes
in mobile networks and cryptographic approaches that address
location privacy of users. In section VI, we further identify the
challenges and open issues. Finally, we conclude our review
in section VII.
II. DEFINITIONS, SECURITY AND PRIVACY
REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCATION-BASED SERVICES
In vehicular and mobile, the security and privacy require-
ments have strong dependencies with other requirements such
as basic system requirements which constrain and influence
privacy. We identify the following properties necessary for
security and privacy in vehicular and mobile networks.
A. Definitions
a) On-board Unit (OBU): The On-board Unit (OBU)
otherwise called the On-board Equipment (OBE) is installed
on a vehicle and composed of various sensors and electronic
components through which various forms of data can be
collected, processed and exchanged for safety purposes.
b) Road-side Unit(RSU): The Road-side Units(RSU)
takes the form of an access point which is used together with
a vehicle and extends the telecommunication infrastructure
as well as facilitate the routing of messages in an efficient
manner. The number of RSUs, manner of their deployment and
placement is key to ensure that maximum number of vehicles
have enough coverage. They can be located at intersections and
point-of-interest (PoI) locations where they form connectivity
with vehicles within their communication range.
c) Trusted Third-Party(TTP): A Trusted Third-Party
(TTP) is defined by the joint technical committee of the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the
International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) (ISO/IEC)
as an entity trusted by users/vehicles for security functions.
The security functions may include support for the issuance,
use of and verification of digital certificates and signatures,
and confidentiality services.
d) Certificate Authority (CA): Vehicle to vehicle or ve-
hicle to infrastructure communication between vehicles and
the infrastructure are not only required to be secure but also
trustworthy. During communication, some vehicles may be-
come selfish or malicious. Such malicious deviate from normal
protocol and disrupt network activity such as transmitting
fake location data. To mitigate such situations, a higher level
TTP called a Certificate Authority (CA) is used to bootstrap
the vehicle registration. The TTP also issues vehicles with
pseudonym certificates which facilitates accountability and
revocation.
e) Registration Authority (RA): Depending on the de-
ployment specifics, a separate third-party which is known as
the Registration Authority (RA) may be needed to provide
authentication and authorization services to both vehicles and
LBS providers.
f) V2V: Vehicle to vehicle communication is one form in
which vehicles exchange messages with each other. Vehicle to
vehicle communication is particularly useful since it allows
short and medium range communication with no need for
infrastructure (e.g. RSU support).
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g) V2R: Different from V2V communication, the vehicle
to infrastructure (V2R) communication paradigm is a mode of
VANET message exchange which facilitates communication
between vehicles and the infrastructure.
B. Security Requirements
1) Authentication: The authentication process in vehicular
and mobile networks should be privacy preserving. A user
must be authenticated when it requests joining the LBS i.e.
when it sends a request to the Service Provider (SP) through
a nearby RSU or Base station. A privacy preserving key
management scheme is desirable for LBS in vehicular and
mobile networks. Messages exchanged between entities should
be authenticated and integrity-protected.
2) Confidentiality: Confidentiality is necessary to protect
LBS contents from passive eavesdroppers. Confidentiality
guarantees the delivery of messages to designated recipients
or authorised parties. Data confidentiality can be applied by
using encryption techniques based on secure key management
system.
3) Traceability and Revocation: A user that abuses the
network should be traceable by an authority. The revocation of
the misbehaving user by the authority should be timely. This
reduces the impact of the misbehaving user on the network.
4) Efficiency: The cryptographic protocols used in vehicu-
lar and mobile networks should be computationally efficient.
The key management scheme must incur limited computa-
tional overhead. To ensure effective operation, lightweight key
management scheme should be used.
C. Privacy Requirements
1) Short-term linkability: Short-term linkability is a desir-
able property in ITS applications [21]. Assuming a vehicle
sends two or more messages within a small time frame δt, the
receiving vehicle should be able to verify that these messages
came from the same source. Enforcing short-term linkability
ensures that a compromised OBU cannot impersonate multiple
vehicles and launch a Sybil attack [22]. In vehicular networks,
vehicles frequently broadcast messages with their speed, cur-
rent location and acceleration. These messages are used to
build up a trajectory of nearby OBUs. The location privacy
of users is not affected by short-term linkability because the
small time increment δt does not impact the location privacy
of the vehicle [23].
2) Long-term unlinkability: A basic location privacy re-
quirement for vehicular networks is long-term unlinkability.
An adversary must not be able to link messages sent by a
vehicle to the attributes of that vehicle such as location, type of
car and applications. Tracking protection must be implemented
to protect the users from linkability of two or more successive
positions. In mobile networks, the service provider should be
unable to link two or more successive positions of the user.
3) Anonymity: Anonymity focuses on the protection of the
user’s identity. It is a term used to mean the ability of the
user to access a resource or service without disclosing its user
identity. This means that the subject may perform an action
without disclosing its user identity to third-parties. Anonymity
techniques provide means to know the set of users that cannot
see the identity of someone performing certain actions. Hence,
when the action of a user is anonymous, another subject will
not be able to determine either the identity or even a reference
to the identity of the user.
4) Pseudonymity: Pseudonymity is a technique used to
ensure that a user may use access a resource or service without
disclosing its identity, but can still be accountable for that use.
Since the user is accountable for the use, it can be regarded
as conditional pseudonymity or reversible pseudonymity. Ac-
countability is achieved if the user’s real identity is directly
linked to a reference (an alias or pseudonym) held by an
entity such as the certificate authority, or by providing an
alias that will be used for processing purposes, such as an
account number. Conditional pseudonymity is required where
the identity information of violators need to be revealed by law
enforcement authorities for liability purposes. Similarities exist
between pseudonymity and anonymity. While both protects the
identity of the user, pseudonymity uses a reference to the user’s
identity for accountability.
5) Accountability(Non-repudiation): Anonymity is condi-
tional on good reputation. While anonymity protects the
location privacy of users, a misbehaving or faulty vehicle
that caused an accident needs to be identified for possible
prosecution. Note that pseudonyms are linked to information
that allows the certificate authority to establish a forensic
evidence against a misbehaving users for the purpose of
accountability.
6) Location Privacy: The exact location information of the
user must be protected from unauthorised entities. The user’s
trajectory which contains location data of the user’s present
and past locations including points of interest must not be
revealed to unauthorized entities.
III. ADVERSARY MODELS, LOCATION PRIVACY METRICS
AND LOCATION PRIVACY ATTACKS
A. Adversary Models
Location privacy approaches proposed in literature share
common characteristics. Several privacy metrics consider some
sort of adversaries. The authors in [24] point out that the more
knowledgeable the adversary is, the lower the location privacy.
We classify the adversaries described in literature as follows:
1) Global/Local: The range of an adversary is used to
determine if it is a global or local adversary. Global adversaries
have access to the whole network. Local adversaries are
limited to a part of the network. For example, eavesdroppers
can have access to a limited number of RSUs deployed at road
intersections [25].
2) Active/Passive: An active adversary can meddle with the
network by injecting or modifying messages. Passive adver-
saries cannot modify messages, they only read and observe
information transmitted by participating nodes in the network
[20].
3) Static/Adaptive: Static adversaries choose an attacking
technique or strategy before launching an attack regardless of
how the attack progresses. Adaptive adversaries observe the
network by learning the system configuration and parameters.
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In location privacy, most threat models use adaptive adver-
saries which are described in the context of location privacy
as inference attacks [26], [27], [28], [29].
4) Internal/External: An internal adversary is considered
to be part of the network. In the context of LBS, untrusted
LBS servers and TTP (anonymizers) are examples of inter-
nal adversaries. Many authors assume that LBS servers are
untrusted [30], [31], [32], [33], [34].
B. Location Privacy Metrics
A number of privacy metrics have been proposed in lit-
erature. For the purpose of this report, we focus on the
location privacy metrics used in the evaluation of the various
approaches to location privacy discussed in this report.
1) Anonymity Set Size: Anonymity set size was introduced
by the authors in [35]. They define anonymity set as the set
of users with the probability of sending a particular message
which is seen by a global observer. This global observer is
assumed to have compromised a set of nodes. the authors
point out that the anonymity set size is a good indicator
of the level of anonymity provided. This concept was used
in modelling the security of Dining Cryptographers (DC)
Networks. According to [24], the anonymity set size counts
the number of users that could be a targeted individual p. It
is described as the size of the area where the targeted user p
can blend.
PrivASS ≡ |ASt |
where |ASt | is the anonymity set of the targeted node. One
of the disadvantages of anonymity set size is that it does not
take prior knowledge into consideration. It solely relies on the
number of users in the system. However, the combination of
anonymity set size and normalized entropy [36] provides a
better privacy guarantee.
2) Entropy: In location privacy, entropy is the quantitative
measure of the of the attacker’s uncertainty. The measure of the
quality of the cloaked location [37]. As a measure of privacy,
it can be described as the actual size of the of the anonymity
set. The authors in [38] describe Entropy as the additional
information needed by the adversary to identify the user. As
shown in the equation below, the estimated probabilities of
the adversary is indicated by the random variable X for every
user in the anonymity set. Entropy is very useful when privacy
is measured more than once. In location privacy, entropy is
computed continuously as a result of the continuous tracking
by adversaries. The authors in [39], [40] use entropy as a
measure of the accuracy of an adversary in disclosing the
user’s position. Entropy can be expressed mathematically as;
PrivENTH(X) = −
N∑
i=1
pilog2(p(i))
where N represents the number of nodes in the anonymity
set and pi represents the probability of i being the targeted
node based on the adversary’s estimation. In [41], normalised
entropy (degree of anonymity) is used for mix zones. Nor-
malised entropy is the ratio of the entropy obtained from the
road network to the entropy obtained from the theoretical mix
zone with the same anonymity set. Pairwise entropy has also
been used in a similar way. Pairwise entropy is the entropy
between two users who are the only members of an anonymity
set. Pairwise has two mapping set, two mapping probabilities
and two events (entry and exit) [41], [42].
3) k-Anonymity: Location k anonymity is achieved when
the exact locations of the user are extended to the cloaked
regions so that each region covers at least k-users. Although a
formal model for k-anonymity was first presented for statisti-
cal databases in [43], It has been used widely used for location
privacy in mobile networks. In location k-anonymity, the user
’s privacy is protected by the utilisation of the current location
rather than the historical locations. The location cloaking
strategies CliqueCloak [44], HilbertCloak [45], Casper [46]
offer location k-anonymity.
4) Cloaking Granularity: Cloaking granularity is proposed
to address the shortcomings of location k-anonymity. In cloak-
ing granularity, the area of the cloaked region must be larger
than the user-specified threshold [47]. Location k-anonymity
does not prevent the disclosure of the user’s information, it
protects the user’s identity (out of k users). Cloaking granu-
larity prevents the user’s information from being disclosed but
fails to protect the users from identity-related attacks when the
user’s location is known publicly.
5) Success Rate of an Adversary: An adversary’s success
rate is a location privacy metric that measures the probability
that an attacker is successful in tracking a targeted user. The
authors in [24] point out that an adversary who is success-
ful can compromise a communication channel or identify a
message sender.
6) Expected Estimation Error: This metric measures the
success of the adversary in reconstructing the targeted trajec-
tory [48]. In location privacy, the expected estimation error of
the adversary is computed by the expected distance between
the true outcome xc and estimated distance x using a distance
metric d. In [48], the posterior probability is used to compute
the expectation of the adversary’s estimates x which is based
on observations o.
PrivAEE ≡
∑
x
Pr(x |o)d(x, xc)
Generally, error based metrics quantify an adversary’s error
when creating his estimate.
7) Mean Time To Confusion (MTTC): Mean time to confu-
sion uses entropy to measure the duration that an adversary’s
uncertainty is below a specified threshold. This is the time
taken by an adversary to correctly follow a trace [39].
8) Flow-based Metric: Flow-based metric uses the statistics
of the mix zone to theoretically evaluate the effectiveness of
the mixing provided by mix zones[49], [50].
9) Accuracy of Obfuscated Area: The relevance metric
models the relative accuracy loss of a given measure with
respect to the maximum accuracy that would have been
achieved in a perfect environmental condition [51].
10) Technological Relevance: This metric measures the
accuracy of the location measurement provided by the LBS
provider [52].
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11) Tracking Uncertainty: This metric measures the prob-
ability that the sample location belongs to a targeted vehicle
[39].
C. Privacy Attacks in LBS
In this section, we define the location privacy attacks in
Mobile Services and Vehicular Networks identified in the
literature.
Trace Analysis attack: In this type of attack, the historical
cloaking regions are linked to the mobility pattern of the user.
The LBS server can derive probabilities of the mobile user
being at different locations of the cloaked region [37].
Colluding attack: Bogus location proofs are generated when
two nodes collude with each other. For example, if a malicious
node m1 needs to prove that he is in a false location, he
can have another colluding node to mutually generate bogus
location proofs for him [33].
Location linking: An attack where the location information
included in the query of the user is used as a quasi-identifier
to reconfirm the identity of the user is described in [40] as a
location linking attack.
Query sampling: The authors in [32] present this attack as a
location privacy attack where an adversary uses the knowledge
of the user’s locations to link the user location to a particular
query.
Snapshot location attack: The authors in [28] and [45] dis-
cuss inference attacks which is similar to trace analysis attacks.
The future location of a user is traced through inference based
on the user’s movement in the past.
Query Tracking Attack: In continuous LBS, the queries have
a lifetime which makes it possible for queries to be traced.
A mobile user that is cloaked with other users at different
instances during the lifetime of the query is susceptible to
query tracking attacks [47].
Trajectory Attack: When an attacker uses a published
trajectory from the LBS-server to deduce the trajectory of the
user [53], [54]. Trajectory attacks can still be possible even if
the identifier of the user has been removed [47].
De-obfuscation Attack: In de-obfuscation attack, an adver-
sary evaluates the relevance gain or loss after a de-obfuscation
attempt [51].
Timing Attack: The adversary observes the time of entry
and exit for each mobile user [41].
Transition Attack: The adversary uses previous observations
to estimate the transition probability for each possible turn in
the intersections [42].
Reconstruction Attack: The adversary tries to reconstruct
the actual trace by assigning probabilities to events that are
possibly related to the trajectory of the user [55].
Inference Attacks: Similar to trace analysis attacks, Adver-
saries trace past movements to determine future locations [56],
[26], [29].
IV. LOCATION PRIVACY/SECURITY IN VEHICULAR
NETWORKS
In this section, a review of the proposed approaches to
location privacy and security are discussed. We divide this
section in to two groups; Privacy enhancing schemes and pri-
vacy preserving authentication schemes that address location
privacy.
A. Privacy Enhancing Schemes That Address Location Pri-
vacy
1) Mix Zones Approaches in Vehicular Networks: Mix
Zones enhance location privacy using anonymous communi-
cation zones. These zones are mostly road intersections where
the speed and direction of a vehicle is likely to change. When
a vehicle enters a mix zone, it stops sending messages and
updates its pseudonym. The effect of changing pseudonyms
frequently in location privacy is examined by the authors in
[57]. In this approach, traffic is generated on non-trivial road
maps with realistic parameters. The authors assume that the
antennas are positioned by attackers in the network to overhear
communication. In their analysis on the effectiveness of mix-
zones, they conclude that the optimal frequency of pseudonym
change depends on the attributes of the mix zones such as the
location, size and the number of entry points.
In [58], Mix Zones are created using cryptographic tech-
niques CMIX at road intersections within the broadcast dis-
tance of the RSUs. The CMIX protocol distributes symmetric
keys using traditional asymmetric cryptography for the estab-
lishment of the cryptographic mix zones. In the CMIX zone,
all broadcast messages by vehicles are encrypted with the
symmetric key distributed by the RSU. The authors claim that
CMIX makes it difficult for an attacker to link the identity of
a vehicle since the same key is used by all vehicles.
A context mix model is introduced in [26], [59] to pro-
tect location privacy in vehicular networks. They argue that
even pseudonyms are changed at random intervals, several
approaches can be used by the attacker to identify the nodes.
They describe the mix zones in [60] as mix-context situations
and include the use of context information such as speed,
direction and number of vehicles to initiate a pseudonym
change. To protect vehicles from location tracking, they define
a threshold for the minimum entropy to identify the best op-
portunity for a pseudonym change. The user or the application
where the pseudonym change is triggered is used to define the
minimum entropy.
To achieve receiver-location privacy in VANETs, the authors
in [61] propose a social-tier-assisted message forwarding pro-
tocol (STAP). STAP protects receiver location privacy from
active global attackers by disseminating messages to social
tiers. Similar to the works in [62], [63], they use social
spots to observe busy intersections in a city environment. The
social tier is a virtual tier formed by social spots. RSUs are
deployed at social spots and a virtual tier is formed with them
without knowledge of the location of the receiver. When the
receiver enters one of the social spots, it can successfully
receive the message that was disseminated to the social tier.
The receiver holds the family of the pseudo-IDs which are
unlinkable and the pseudo-IDs are repeatedly used in the
mutual authentication between the RSUs and the receivers at
social spots.
In [62], [63], the authors propose changing of pseudonym
at social spots (PCS) as a strategy to achieve high location
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privacy. Vehicles temporarily gather at social spots such as free
parking lots that may be close to a shopping mall or at road
intersections when the traffic light turns red. They state that a
social spot becomes a mix zone if pseudonyms are changed by
all the vehicles before leaving that spot. An indistinguishable
information is broadcast as safety message which shows the
location of the vehicle as a social spot at a velocity of 0 with an
unlinkable pseudonym. They show that when pseudonyms are
changed by all the vehicles simultaneously, the high density
makes it difficult for attackers to track the vehicles. However,
pseudonym changing at social spots does not provide sufficient
privacy protection when the vehicle density is low.
In [49], a user-centric game-theoretic mix zone approach
is introduced to measure the evolution of location privacy
over time and evaluates its behaviour in mobile, vehicular
and delay tolerant networks. They argue that even though the
cost of location privacy is reduced by selfish nodes, it can
also threaten the efficiency achieved by multiple pseudonym
in non-cooperative scenarios. They carry out an analysis on
static games using a complete information to get pure and
mixed Nash Equilibria. Using a Bayesian approach, they study
an incomplete information scenario where nodes have no
complete knowledge of the pay-offs of neighbouring nodes.
They look for a symmetric equilibrium where all the nodes
cooperate with the same probability and analyse a dynamic
version of the game showing how it copes with uncertainty.
The pseudonym changes are coordinated by Pseudo-game
protocols which are designed to implement pseudonym change
strategies.
Lu et al. [64] propose a MixGroup scheme for location
privacy. Based on sporadic observations, they exploit meeting
opportunities to change pseudonyms and improve location
privacy. Observations are made from real vehicle traces based
on social spots and sporadic observations. MixGroup is used to
construct an extended pseudonym group region where vehicles
can change their accumulated pseudonyms. Each group has a
group leader and a group identifier. When a vehicle enters a
group, the group leader will assign a group ID with a certificate
and a private key to the new vehicle after authentication.
The group ID, certificate and the private key are used for
changing pseudonyms and broadcasting safety messages. An
entropy-optimal negotiation procedure is used to facilitate the
process of exchanging pseudonyms among vehicles. They
quantitatively measure the risk and benefits associated with the
pseudonym exchange using a pre-defined pseudonym entropy.
2) Silent Period Schemes in Vehicular Networks: A user-
centric scheme for mitigating location tracking is proposed in
[65]. In the Swing technique, the pseudonyms are changed
by the vehicles when their speed and directions are changed.
This makes it difficult for an attacker to correlate the locations
of the node before and after an update by utilizing the
movement predictions of the nodes. In the Swap technique,
location privacy is maximised by the exchange of the vehicle
identifiers. The vehicles exchange their pseudonyms with a
probability of 0.5 during an update and then enter a silent
period. However, indistinguishability is only achieved by
the cooperating vehicles from the vehicle that initiated the
pseudonym change.
In [66], authors pay attention to the mitigation of unau-
thorized location tracking and LBS profiling from service
providers. They identify the vulnerabilities from accumulated
location history of vehicles over time. They also consider
the vulnerabilities associated with additional information from
visited locations from places of interest using geographical
maps thereby enabling profiling of personal interest. They
propose a scheme (AMOEBA) based on the group navigation
of vehicles for user and location privacy. AMOEBA uses a
group concept to provide location privacy. A random silent
period is used to provide unlinkability between the locations
of a vehicle. They consider a scenario where a target vehicle
joins the network and broadcast safety messages. This target
vehicle remains silent and updates its pseudonym from C to
C′ then broadcast with C′ after a random silent period. If a
neighbouring vehicle also updates its pseudonym from D to
D′, the attacker can be misled to track the vehicle as the target
as illustrated in the scenario in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: Effect of random silent period by a vehicle joining the
network
In [67], the author discusses the general issues on
pseudonym changing in VANET. They focus on the influence
of the mobility of the vehicles on pseudonym changes by
adjusting the silent period based on the mobility of the vehicle.
They identify two parameters (node re-interaction and quiet
time) which must be assessed to improve the efficiency of
location privacy achieved by pseudonyms. These parameters
are mainly influenced by the node mobility characteristics.
In order to achieve a high degree of unlinkability between
the pseudonyms, they claim that an optimal interval for
pseudonym change must be adapted to the node interaction
interval.
Different from the approaches in [67], [66], a silent pe-
riod technique SLOW (silent on low-speed) is proposed in
[68]. The SLOW protocol does not need an infrastructure
or cooperation from neighbouring vehicles. When the speed
of the vehicle drops below a pre-defined threshold, vehicles
do not transmit messages. They define this period as the
silent period where vehicles can change their pseudonyms.
They describe a scenario in an urban area that is crowded
whenever a group of vehicles stop at the traffic signal point.
They also create mix zones at the points where there are
maximum uncertainties about a vehicle. The authors claim
that SLOW ensures a smooth synchronization process when
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the pseudonym is changed in the silent period. SLOW also
reduces the burden of large verification of digital signatures
when the vehicle density is large.
Authors in [69] look into the tracking of broadcast commu-
nication of vehicles by adversaries. They propose a location
privacy scheme (CARAVAN) to unlink the locations of a
vehicle. They describe two tracking methods (simple and
correlation tracking) used by adversaries to link two possible
locations of a vehicle and take into account the mobility
and application features of VANETs. CARAVAN combines
a silent period enhancement technique with group navigation
to prevent the tracking of vehicles. The group navigation
provides unlinkability between the vehicle’s pseudonym and
the LBS application that is accessing the service. When an
application request is received from a vehicle, this request
is forwarded by the group leader using its own address to
the registration authority. through the RSU. A session key is
provided by the registration authority to both the LBS provider
and the vehicle after the validation of the application request.
The entire communication between the vehicle and the LBS
provider is encrypted by this key.
3) Caching Schemes in Vehicular networks: To prevent
untrusted LBS from tracking the user locations, the authors in
[70] introduce an intermediary server (CacheCloak) between
the LBS and the user. The CacheCloak server mediates the
flow of data by returning a cached data or getting a new one
from the LBS server when there is a request from a user for a
location-centric data. CacheCloak generates a predicted path
for the user which extends till both ends are connected to other
paths in the cache. They claim that an attacker is unsuccessful
trying to track the location of a user anonymised by the
CacheCloak scheme as a result of the newly generated path
triggered by the scheme. However, the proposed CacheClock
scheme cannot meet the demands of real time applications and
complete service availability.
The authors in [71] point out that majority of the end
users are not aware of the implications of LBS and end up
disclosing their personal data unintentionally. They introduce
a generalized approach (Cache) to minimize the privacy threats
associated with LBS. In Cache, the location enhanced content
can be pre-fetched before it is needed. This content can be
accessed locally from the mobile device when needed. On
each location request, the user can share general geographic
information rather than its current location. They carry out a
feasibility analysis to show that location data can be potentially
cached. One of the disadvantages of the proposed scheme is
its unsuitability for real time applications such as applications
that require the user to check in to a particular location
from a server. Another downside of the Cache scheme is the
limitation in the size of the cells in the content download,
update and priority grids which is defined by the developer of
the application.
In [72], authors propose a framework that enhances privacy
of LBS in vehicular communication. The focus on dedicated
short range communications and explore the unique features
of queries from in-vehicle users. In this approach, the data is
periodically broadcast by RSUs. The vehicles download the
data which are cached by the OBU. When POI information
is requested by an in-vehicle user, it checks with the OBU
to avoid issuing incoherent queries or duplicates to the LBS
server. The authors point out that if an attacker obtains LBS in-
formation, the trajectory and point location privacy are leaked.
They develop a POI query probability model based on space
related feature of LBS queries. Three broadcasting content
selection algorithms are developed using knowledge based
pre-caching and an adaptive updating method to enhance the
location privacy of users. In a detailed performance analysis,
they claim that their proposed scheme can protect location
privacy by reducing the number of queries needed for LBS.
4) Obfuscation Approaches in Vehicular Networks: In [39],
a delay is introduced into the anonymisation process. The
basic idea is using a path confusion algorithm to perform a
posteriori analysis of the path of the users. Assuming two
users pass through an intersection similar to [60] at time t0
and t1 respectively where t0 < t1 < t0 + tdelay . The posteriori
analysis is performed at tdelay . The paths intersect in a way
that anonymity is created. Although two users were not in the
location at the same time, the user location is not known by
the LBS until both of them have crossed the intersection point.
In this scheme, the real time operation is compromised by the
introduction of delay. If the anonymity accumulated after t0
+ tdelay is insufficient, the path confusion algorithm may not
release the location of the user to the LBS.
A mutual obfuscating path (MOP) [73] is proposed for
location privacy in connected vehicles. MOP is used to retrieve
spatiotemporal information in real time. Different from other
approaches, MOP does not make use of the intersections in the
user’s path. MOP takes advantage of the dedicated short range
communication (DSRC) radios to obfuscate location tracking.
They consider a communication range of 200 − 400m as the
DSRC beacon when two vehicles communicate using the LBS
server to determine whether the MOPs can be generated. MOP
is performed when a vehicle receives a beacon. As explained in
[73], assuming vehicle A wants to mutually obfuscate the path
with vehicle B, the kinematic information such as the current
location locBcur , speed speed
B
cur and the direction dir
B
cur are
used to define a threshold for the convergence time Tthld .
The MOP process requires cooperation from neighbouring
vehicles. According to the authors, a selfish or non-cooperative
vehicle threatens its own privacy by not cooperating since
the LBS uses posteriori reasoning to guarantee the mutual
obfuscation of all connected paths.
In Table 1, we provide a detailed summary of location
privacy enhancing schemes, privacy metrics used and location
privacy attack addressed in for vehicular networks.
B. Privacy Preserving Authentication Schemes that address
Location Privacy in Vehicular Networks
In this section, we discuss privacy preserving authentication
schemes that achieve location privacy. These privacy preserv-
ing schemes are based on symmetric and asymmetric key
cryptography in vehicular networks.
1) Symmetric Key Authentication Schemes (SKAS): Sym-
metric encryption is often referred to as single key cryp-
tography. In symmetric encryption, a single key is used the
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TABLE I: Summary of Privacy Enhancing Schemes that address Location Privacy in Vehicular Networks
Category Strategy Privacy Metric Location Privacy at-
tack addressed
Issues Addressed
Mix Zone Buttyan et al.
[57]
Entropy Movement tracking Evaluates the success probability of an
attacker based on traffic density.
Mix Zone CMIX [58] Adversary success
ratio & Entropy
Location tracking Addresses indistinguishability, location
privacy in the context of traffic congestion
& vehicle density.
Mix Zone Context mix
model [59]
Average tracking
time
Inference attacks Pseudonym changing based on traffic den-
sity.
Mix Zone STAP [61] Delivery ratio & de-
lay
Location tracking Focus on location privacy of the receiver.
Mix Zone PCS [63] Anonymity set size Location tracking Anonymity set analysis for small and large
social spots.
Mix Zone Freudiger et .
al. [49]
Upperbound Trace analysis Measures evolution of location privacy
with game-theoretic model.
Mix Zone MixGroup
[64]
Entropy Region-based location
tracking & trajectory
reconstruction
Enhancement of location privacy by the
integration of group signatures and the
construction of a pseudonym changing re-
gion.
Silent Period Swing & Swap
[65]
Entropy Location tracking Maximizing & increasing location privacy
.
Silent Period AMOEBA
[66]
Entropy Simple and correlation
tracking
Addresses location privacy by mitigating
location tracking and user privacy by pro-
viding anonymous access to LBS.
Silent Period Eichler [67] Average required
quiet time
N/A Uses node re-interaction and quiet time to
increase the degree of unlinkability
Silent Period SLOW [68] Tracking success rate Syntactic and semantic
linking
Ensures synchronized silent period and
pseudonym change for many vehicles.
Silent Period CARAVAN
[69]
anonymity set size Simple and correlation
tracking
Addresses location privacy threats due to
location tracking attacks.
Caching
Scheme
Cache [71] Pre-fetching & dis-
connected operation
N/A Adjust the size of the geographical content
to improve user location privacy.
Caching
Scheme
CacheClock
[70]
Location entropy Location tracking Predicted paths are extended until the in-
tersect with other paths in the cache to
prevent location tracking.
Obfuscation
Scheme
Path confusion
algorithm [39]
Mean time to confu-
sion & tracking un-
certainty
Trace analysis Guarantees a defined maximum time for
all vehicles including vehicles in low den-
sity areas.
Obfuscation
Scheme
MOP [73] Location entropy &
tracking success
Location tracking The true path of the vehicles are hidden
over long trajectories.
sender and receiver in the encryption process where both
parties have to agree on a single (shared) secret key. In
VANETs, Symmetric Key Authentication Schemes (SKAS)
use symmetric key cryptography for message authentication.
Each vehicle uses its key or a group key that is shared for
message verification.
In [74], the authors identify information contained in the
message broadcast by vehicles as the position of the vehicles,
speed and direction. They point out that this information can
lead to tracking of vehicles by an adversary and highlight
the necessity of protecting this information which are sent as
broadcast messages by vehicles. They propose a privacy pre-
serving group communication PPGCV scheme for VANETs.
PPGCV is based on a security threshold scheme and a proba-
bilistic key distribution technique. In PPGCV, a new group key
can be calculated and a compromised key list updated even
if the vehicle has missed the group rekeying process. PPGVC
has two phases: the key bootstrapping phase and the group
rekeying phase. In the key bootstrapping phase, each vehicle
in the network chooses a set of keys randomly from a key
pool. This set of keys is used as key encrypting keys (KEKs)
and an additional key is added for group communication. The
group rekeying phase is initiated when the revocation of a
vehicle’s membership needs to be carried out by the key server.
To achieve location privacy, each vehicle selects random keys
from its key set and the IDs of those keys that have been
broadcast. In PPGCV, the computation of the threshold scheme
results in a high computational overhead.
Inspired by [75], a time efficient and secure vehicular
communication protocol (TSVC) is proposed by the authors
in [76]. A symmetric MAC operation is performed at the
receiver to authenticate the source of the message. Different
from the approach in [74], a short MAC tag is attached to each
message to reduce the traffic density. To generate a MAC with
neighbouring vehicles, a vehicle broadcasts a commitment of
hash chain which is authenticated by other vehicles. The speed
of the MAC verification of TSVC helps in the reduction of low
ratio. More emphasis is laid on the privacy of the data source
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since each vehicle has a list of anonymous public/private
keys alongside with their public key certificates at the initial
stage. They claim that it is difficult to track the driver with
the anonymous certificate due to the short lifetime of the
public key certificate. The proposed scheme addresses only
the privacy of the data source, TSVC is vulnerable to trace
analysis attacks as TTPs can reveal the identity of the targeted
vehicle by using its pseudo-ID to perform a database look up.
The authors in [77] propose two schemes (RAISE and
COMET) to preserve privacy in VANETs. RSU-aided Au-
thentication Scheme (RAISE) and Cooperative Message Au-
thentication Schemes (COMET) are targeted at VANET ap-
plications. RAISE adopts the property of k-anonymity where
a message cannot be linked to a vehicle. The RSUs assist
the vehicles in the authentication of messages. Key agreement
and mutual authentication is first performed when a vehicle
enters the region covered by the RSU. This is followed by a
short MAC generated by the sender and shared between the
sender and the RSU. The authors claim that communication
overhead is reduced compared to other approaches and that
there is an improvement in the efficiency of the authentication
when RAISE is used. In the early deployment of VANETs
where RSUs may not be widespread, a supplementary scheme
COMET is used to verify a small percentage of the message
signatures based on their computational capacities. Although
location privacy has not been explicitly addressed, the authors
look into user related privacy information such as the travelling
route, name of the driver, model of vehicle and the licence
plate. RAISE is highly dependent on infrastructure and no
provision has been made for key revocation.
The authors in [78] point out that PKI cannot provide
certain security requirements such as location privacy. They
introduce complementary security mechanisms that can meet
the security requirements of location privacy. The proposed
privacy scheme is based on random encryption period (REP)
[79]. This approach relies on a security threshold scheme and
a probabilistic key distribution. They point out that location
privacy can only be achieved if the OBUs changing their
certificates have an anonymity set size that is greater than
one. REP is triggered when there is a request by an OBU
to change its certificate. REP uses a secret key to create
an encryption zone around the OBUs and this group key is
shared between the OBUs. REP also prevents adversaries from
overhearing messages when there is a certificate update, this
action decreases the probability of tracking an OBU.
A dynamic privacy preserving key management scheme
(DIKE) is proposed in [80]. Each vehicle is authenticated
before joining an LBS. A pseudo-ID is used to hide the identity
of a vehicle during the service session. To achieve privacy
preservation, a privacy preserving authentication mechanism
is used which also provides restriction for double registration
entries. The service session key update procedures is divided
into different time slots, each time slot holds a different
session key. To reduce key update delay, the forward secrecy
technique is used to update the new key session autonomously.
A dynamic threshold technique is used to achieve backward
secrecy. The authors claim that the proposed scheme is more
flexible and can resist possible collusion from the vehicles that
leave the LBS session.
2) Asymmetric Key Authentication Schemes (AKAS):
Asymmetric Key Authentication Schemes (AKAS) use Public
Key Cryptography (PKC) or digital signatures for signing and
verification of messages. In AKAS, two keys (public and
private) are used for encryption and decryption. A message
encrypted by the public key can only be decrypted by the
corresponding private key. AKAS can be classified into two
categories: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based and Iden-
tity (ID)-based authentication. The PKI-based authentication
relies on accessibility to infrastructure to verify, revoke and
add new certificates. ID-based authentication uses ID-based
crypto-systems to reduce communication overheads. ID-based
authentication simplifies the process of managing certificates
by using the identity of the vehicles in signing and verifying
digital signatures [81].
In [81], the authors propose group signatures and identity-
based signatures to address security and conditional privacy
preservation. The group signature is used to secure the com-
munication between the OBUs. The senders anonymously sign
the messages and their identities can only be revealed by
the authorities. To authenticate the messages sent by each
RSU, identity-based signatures are used to digitally sign each
message. GSIS consist of four phases, the first phase is the
registration of members by the membership manager who
generates a private key for each vehicle. In the second phase,
the message is signed by the vehicle and processed in the
third phase. A time-stamp is used to verify the signature and
membership traceability is achieved in the fourth phase using
the real identity of the message signer.
In [82], an efficient and a robust pseudonym-based au-
thentication scheme is proposed. The authors point out that
messages produced by a vehicle over a protocol selectable
period can be linked. However, messages generated at different
time intervals t1, t2 cannot be linked if t2 > t1 + γ (where
γ is the protocol selectable period). They point out that
when γ is shorter, it is difficult to track the messages. They
propose a hybrid signature scheme which combines group
signatures (ECDSA) and a pseudonym scheme. Each vehicle
is equipped with a group public key and a group signing key.
These keys are certified by the authorities without revealing
any information identifying the vehicle. This scheme uses a
self-generating pseudonym scheme to eliminate the need for
storing, refilling and correspondent private keys. Although a
targeted vehicle becomes less traceable as γ becomes smaller
in dense environments, vehicles will incur more computational
and communication cost based on this approach.
An efficient conditional privacy preserving (ECPP) scheme
is proposed in [83]. ECPP addresses unlinkability attack,
which is described in this context as the moving track attack
on the location of the OBU. They develop a probabilistic
model to characterize the risk from compromised RSUs. They
assume that 0.2% of the RSUs can be compromised at most
since the RSU are robust in reality. The Location privacy
is guaranteed using the short time certificate. A short group
signature scheme based on verifier local-revocation [84] is
constructed to provide anonymous authentication. They claim
that the short term certificate guarantees the location privacy
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO.XX, XX 2018 10
of the OBU since the location of the OBU cannot be judged.
In [85], authors propose a location privacy scheme using
blind signatures to hide the identity and trajectory of moving
vehicles. They use a fast blind signature based on elliptic
curve cryptography to generate fast signatures and define the
overlapped radiation range of two APs as a blind zone. In
Fig. 2, we illustrate the working principle of the blind zone
with many vehicles moving into the blind zone. AP 2 does
no know which AP the vehicles are handed over from and
the vehicles in the serving area cannot be distinguished. In
the proposed scheme, the authentication credentials used by
the vehicles to perform handover are blind to the APs that
are not associated with the serving area. If a vehicle v moves
from one AP serving area APi to another APi+1, the vehicle
sends a message through APi . APi is responsible for sending
authentication information about v to APi+1 in advance which
is regarded as a pre-authentication. APi+1 signs the message
without knowing its contents. Movement tracking is avoided
with tracking probability. They use a tracking probability to
describe the probability that a vehicle is being tracked and
formulate the tracking probability as: P(n, s) =∏ sd
i=1
1
ni
≈ 1n s
d
where d is the diameter of an AP’s radiation range, n is the
average number of vehicles over the total blind zones and
s is the total distance travelled. They show that the more the
average number of vehicles over the total blind zones the more
efficient the tracking probability.
Fig. 2: The blind zone
In [23], authors propose temporary anonymous certified
keys (TACKs) to provide privacy in VANETs. In TACKs, the
OBU uses a private/public key pair to sign broadcast messages.
These signatures ensure a short term unlinkability and message
integrity. This is because the signature is generated only by
the owner of the private key and a single key pair is used
by the OBU for a short period of time. They agree that
group signatures and region based certificates provide long
term unlinkability. However, they argue that cryptography
does not provide protection against correlation attack. In
correlation attack, an adversary observes the temporal and
spatial correlations between the different keys to track target
vehicles. An adversary can associate an old key with a new
one if the keys are changed by a single OBU at a time. TACKs
addresses long term unlinkability using the anonymity set size.
They use a traffic model with Poisson distribution rate of
λ = [0.5, 0.8] to analyse vehicles moving along the highway.
They describe the number of vehicles entering a new region
and changing keys simultaneously as X ∼ Poisson (δ.λ) based
on the batching response for δ seconds. They use iterated
expectations to determine the size of the anonymous set after
the OBU has changed its region.
In [86], a Light-weight Privacy-Preserving protocol (LPP)
is proposed to provide mutual authentication for V2V and
V2I communications. LPP integrates chameleon signature with
ECDSA to provide security and privacy for VANET communi-
cation. They point out that unlinkability may not be guaranteed
as the public key issued by the signer for verification may
be peeped by attackers. The authors redesign the chameleon
hash signature with Abelian group formed by the points on
the elliptic curve [87]. The proposed LPP consist of three
phases: the mutual registration phase, the authentication phase
and the tracking phase. In the mutual registration phase, The
OBUs and the RSUs register to a CA where related secret
information is preloaded. In the mutual authentication phase,
the RSU initiates authentication with the OBU by establishing
a pair-wise key between each other. The tracking phase is
initiated when there is a dispute event to be resolved by the
CA. They claim that LPP achieves anonymity and unlinkability
using the pair-wise key which produces encrypted certificates.
An authentication framework with privacy preservation is
proposed by the authors in [88], [89]. This scheme uses an
ID-based cryptography and self-defined pseudonyms to pre-
serve location privacy. An ID-based Offline Online Signatures
(IBOOS) scheme is used to authenticate V2V communication
while an ID-based signature scheme is used for V2R and R2V
authentication. They focus on identity revealing and location
tracking attacks. The authors claim that by updating the
pseudonyms frequently during communications, the proposed
scheme successfully defends the vehicles against location
tracing and user profiling.
A decentralized lightweight authentication scheme TEAM
(Trust-Extended Authentication Mechanism) is proposed by
the authors in [90] for highly dynamic environments. TEAM
does not use a central authority to authenticate vehicular com-
munications, the concept of transitive trust is adopted to im-
prove the authentication procedures. They address movement
tracking attacks in V2V communication and classify vehicles
based on trust relationship. A dynamic identification process is
used to prevent the attacker from tracing the vehicle’s physical
position. The session key is generated using a pseudo random
number. They claim that when the OBUs have no access to
service, they use random silent period scheme to enhance
location privacy.
We summarize the cryptographic approaches proposed in
literature for Vehicular networks in Table II.
V. LOCATION PRIVACY/SECURITY IN MOBILE NETWORKS
In this section, we review the existing works on location
privacy approaches for mobile networks. We divide this section
into two categories. The first category discusses the location
privacy enhancing technologies proposed in literature. The
second category presents the cryptographic schemes that ad-
dress location privacy in mobile networks. We also review the
different techniques for preventing location related attacks.
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TABLE II: Summary of Authentication Schemes that address Location privacy in Vehicular Networks
Scheme Cryptographic
method
Communication
Pattern
Non-
Repudiation
Emergency
Communication
Mechanism for Privacy
Preservation
Location Privacy at-
tack addressed
GSIS [81] Group & ID-based Sig-
natures
V2V & V2I Yes Yes Anonymity-based Long term Unlinka-
bility
Hybrid [82] Group Signature &
ECDSA
V2V Yes No Pseudonym-based long term tracking
PPGVC [74] HMAC V2V Yes No Anonymity-based N/A
TSVC [76] HMAC V2V No No Pseudonym-based Source node privacy
RAISE [77] HMAC V2V & V2I Yes No Pseudonym-based Trace analysis
REP [79] PKI V2V & V2I Yes No Pseudonym-based Location tracking
ECPP [83] ID-based Cryptography V2V & V2I Yes No Anonymity-based Movement tracking
Zhang et
al.[85]
Blind Signatures-ECC V2I Yes No Anonymity-based Movement tracking
TACKs [23] ECDSA-based PKI V2V & V2I Yes No Pseudonym-based Correlation attacks
LPP [86] EC-Chameleon Hash V2V & V2I Yes No Pseudonym-based Unlinkabilty
Lu et al.
[88]
ID-Based
Cryptography and
Signatures
V2V & V2I Yes No Pseudonym-based Location tracking
TEAM [90] SHA-512 V2V No No Anonymity-based Movement tracking
DIKE [80] ID-based Signatures V2V & V2I No No Pseudonym-based Collusion attacks
A. Location Privacy Enhancing Schemes in Mobile Networks
1) Mix Zones in Mobile Networks: The concept of mix
zone was introduced by [60] and refined in [91] by the same
authors. In the mix zone model, the identity of a user is
anonymised by putting a limit to the positions a user can
be located. They define a mix zone for a connected spatial
region for a group of users. The model assumes that there is
a middle-ware system that is trusted which is placed between
the location services and third-party applications. The third-
party applications are provided with anonymised location
information using the middle-ware mechanism. The anonymity
set technique is applied to location information collected at
different intervals. The mix zone model prevents the tracking
of long term movement of a user. Evaluation results show that
there is a higher degree of unlinkability over a larger and more
populated area between pseudonyms. However, they identified
their drawbacks as the quantitative measure of the location
privacy used. According to them, the size of the anonymity
set only is an upper bound estimate and recommended the
use of location entropy which is derived from historical data.
The authors in [50] clearly point out that the success of the
adversary in tracking location information is relatively high
even if the mix zones are placed in optimal locations. This is
because the users must remain silent inside the mix zones with
no communication with the LBS. This approach also increases
the linkability of user queries since the size of mix zones are
kept small.
In [50], a mix zone is modelled as an optimization problem.
They consider a network with a Trusted Authority (TA) that is
responsible for the security and privacy of the network. Based
on the mobility profile of mobile nodes, they propose a metric
for evaluating the effectiveness of possible mix zone locations.
An analysis of the optimal placement of mix zones is carried
out with combinatorial techniques to maximise the achieved
location privacy.
MobiMix [41], [42] is proposed for mobile users travelling
on road networks. They point out that where there is a high
uncertainty in the trajectories followed by users, mix zones
can be constructed as road intersections. Compared to the
approach in [60], they identify the challenges imposed by
the road network on the anonymity provided by mix zones.
As an example, they use the timing information of the user’s
entry and exit into the mix zone. The non-uniformity of these
transitions at road intersections are also taken into considera-
tions. These constraints give adversaries information to predict
the mapping between old and new pseudonyms. They argue
on the construction of mix zones and take certain factors
into consideration including; the geometry of the zones, the
temporal and spatial resolution of the location exposure, the
statistical behaviour of the user population and the constraints
on the movement pattern of the users. A suite of mix zone
construction technique is developed to guarantee a certain level
of privacy regarding unlinkability between the old and new
pseudonyms.
2) Obfuscation-based Approaches in Mobile Networks:
Location privacy threats may be reduced by degrading the
precision of location information [92]. In [93], authors propose
an obfuscation and a negotiation approach for location privacy.
A framework for obfuscated LBS is defined with a com-
putationally efficient mechanism for balancing high-quality
information needs against the individual needs for location pri-
vacy. They use imprecision to degrade the quality of location
information. Negotiations are used to ensure that the service
provider of the LBS has access to only the services associated
with it. Negotiation also provides guaranteed satisfaction to
mobile and location-aware systems.
A spatial obfuscation approach is presented in [94], [51].
They propose a location privacy technique that protects user’s
privacy according to their application context and preferences.
A new dimensional metric called relevance is introduced.
This metric provides a measure of the privacy of location mea-
surement and a dimensional technology dependent measure of
the location accuracy. The main contribution of this approach
is the protection of the user’s path privacy.
One advantage of this obfuscation approach is that it
provides location privacy without using a TTP, a user can
define the obfuscation area. However, there is a degradation
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in the precision of user’s position. Cheng et al. [28] studied
the trade off between privacy and precision. They propose
an intuitive model for cloaked location data representation.
Their work focuses on location-based range query (LRQ).
The current location of a user within a fixed distance is used
for the notification of any object of interest when issuing an
LRQ. LRQ is a type of query commonly used in applications
using LBS. To cloak location data, they propose an imprecise
location-based range query technique (ILRQ). ILRQ provides
probabilistic certainties to queries indicating the degree of
confidence in these queries. They introduce patching and de-
laying to prevent the location of the user from being deduced.
Patching combines the previous cloak locations with current
cloak location. Delaying technique is based on the delaying
the timing requirements, the request is suspended until the
location that is cloaked fits into the maximum bound.
The authors in [55] argue that the distortion actual trajectory
of the users and the envisaged reconstructed trajectory, the
better the location privacy that will be achieved. They point
out that the degree of location privacy by a privacy preserving
mechanism depends on how ineffectual the attacker is in the
reconstruction of the locations of the users overtime. They
propose a distortion-based metric to measure the location
privacy of mobile users. This metric measures the user’s
location privacy using the distortion level in each part of the
reconstructed trajectory of the user by the attacker.
The authors in [95] point out that the user’s location
privacy information can be obtained by observing the sequence
of successive query request. They propose a comprehensive
trajectory privacy approach with ambient conditions to cloak
user’s location depending on the privacy profile of the user.
They use an r anonymity mechanism to pre-process a set
of trajectories that are similar. This is done to blur the
user’s actual trajectory. To protect the privacy of the user,
k-anonymity is combined with the road segments. To hide
the trajectory of the user, they introduce a time-obfuscated
technique which breaks the sequence of issuing time for the
queries to confuse the LBS about the user’s trajectories.
3) Location Cloaking In Mobile Networks: One of the most
popular approaches used in protecting location privacy is the
location cloaking technique. In [40], the authors formulate
a metric for location anonymity. They clearly point out that
depending on the trusted entities, anonymisation in LBS must
be tackled at different levels in the network. They propose
an adaptive interval cloaking technique (Interval Cloak) for
location broker services that are centralized. They point out
that disclosing the exact snapshot location can result in lo-
cation linking attacks. In this type of attack, the adversary
obtains location-based information from the user query to re-
identify the user. A quadtree-based algorithm is introduced
to reduce location resolutions which guarantee k-anonymous
location information.
A spatio-temporal cloaking based on k-anonymity model
is proposed by [44], [96]. Different from the approach in
[40], which makes use of a uniformed k for all messages;
they use efficient algorithms to support customizable k per
message. Based on the specific privacy requirements, a dif-
ferent k anonymity value is used to identify each message.
They propose a new cloaking algorithm called CliqueCloak.
In order to maintain the desired k-anonymity property, a
preferred spatial and temporal tolerance level is specified by
each message. To anonymize a message that originates from a
mobile user, the spatial location information contained in the
message is changed into a two-dimensional spatial box. The
cloaking algorithm converts the time-stamp of the message
into a temporal interval based on the message’s anonymity
constraint specification.
A Peer-to-Peer spatial cloaking algorithm is presented in
[97]. In this approach, mobile and stationary users can enable
LBS without revealing their exact location information. Mobile
users form a group with neighbours before requesting for LBS
using single or multi-hop routing. The spatial cloaked area is
computed as the entire region that covers the neighbouring
nodes. The two modes of operations supported are; the on-
demand mode and the proactive mode. In the on-demand
mode, the cloaking algorithm is executed by the mobile nodes
when they need to access information from the LBS server. In
the proactive mode, mobile clients look around occasionally
to find the desired number of peers. To get information from
the LBS server, they cloak their exact locations into spatial
regions.
The authors in [97] propose a new framework called Casper
[46] for providing privacy to mobile and stationary users.
Casper has two main components; a privacy-aware query pro-
cessor and a location anonymizer. The privacy-aware processor
is placed in the LBS database server. This is done specifically
to deal with cloaked spatial area instead of the exact loca-
tion information. The anonymizer smears the exact location
information of the users. Three query types are introduced
to the LBS server; private queries over private data, private
queries over public data and public queries over private data.
A privacy-aware processor is introduced to produce a unified
framework for the new query types. They also point out that
scalability and accuracy is achieved with a large number of
users with different privacy requirements.
In [98], authors investigate the problem with location
cloaking to meet the specified privacy requirements of the
user for continue LBS queries. They propose a mobility-
aware cloaking technique to resist trace analysis attacks.The
mobility- aware cloaking technique consists of 3 components;
a mobility location cloaker, a progressive query processor
and a result refiner. The mobility location cloaker cloaks the
location of a user to a region while the progressive query
processor evaluates the result superset for the location-based
query. The result refiner filters the superset to produce the
same query result for the user.
In [32], the authors identify the limitations of the applica-
bility of existing privacy location techniques. They point out
that existing works do not differentiate between location and
privacy queries. They propose a new spatial cloaking algorithm
that clearly differentiates between location and query privacy
using snapshots and location-based queries. The proposed
approach provides support for private LBS to users with public
locations. Spatial cloaking is performed when queries are
issued rather than rigorously cloaking every single location
update. The main objective of this approach is to anonymize
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the link between the user’s location and the location-based
queries. This anonymisation protects the user’s location from
adversaries trying to link the user’s location to the submitted
query.
The authors in [99] argue that the complete knowledge of
the entire system poses a serious threat if the anonymizer is
compromised. They clearly point out that proposed techniques
may fail to provide spatial anonymity for some distribution
of user locations. To preserve the anonymity of users, they
propose a decentralised architecture called PRIVE for issuing
spatial queries to LBS. Based on the Hilbert space-filling
curve, they develop a k-ASR construction algorithm that
guarantees the anonymity of the queries issued even if the
location of the user is known by the adversaries. They also
develop a distributed pool for mobile systems to form a fault-
tolerant overlay network through self-organisation.
A framework is proposed by [53] to provide anonymity
guarantee while requesting for LBS. They identify two main
issues: the assumptions made in each scenario about the
knowledge of the attacker and the quasi-identifiers in LBS
request. They clearly point out that attacks are not properly
characterized and defined. To this effect, they define the
notions of attack, defence function and safe request based
on the attacker’s perceived knowledge. They model different
types of knowledge that may be available to the attacker and
develop a generalized algorithm that assumes knowledge about
the location of users.
In [100], a PRIVACYDGRID approach is presented in
mobile information delivery systems. This approach supports
anonymous location-based queries and provides a unified
location anonymisation framework. They develop a profile
model with privacy preference which allows mobile users
to define their preferred location privacy requirements. They
also develop cloaking algorithms for k-anonymity and location
l-diversity models for the PRIVACYDGRID framework. A
bottom-up and top-down search technique for cloaking regions
are combined to lower the anonymisation time.
A non-exposure cloaking algorithm is proposed by [101],
this algorithm is specifically designed for k-anonymity. The
proximity of information among users is used to perform
the cloaking rather than their mobile coordinates. Two prob-
lems are formulated from cloaking users without exposing
their accurate locations: secure bounding and proximity k-
clustering. An optimal progressive bounding algorithm is pro-
posed for secure bounding which they claim is cost effective.
A t-connectivity k-clustering algorithm is proposed for k-
clustering to isolate clusters. Authors claim that these privacy
aware algorithms are robust and efficient under various system
settings and proximity topologies.
In [45], two cloaking algorithms are proposed to prevent
location identity inference of users issuing spatial queries to
LBS. The first cloaking algorithm - Nearest Neighbour Cloak
(NNC) is a version of the Center Cloak which is resistant to
anonymising spatial region attacks. The NNC first determines
the anonymity set containing user and his k-1 nearest neigh-
bours. A random user is then selected from the anonymity set
to compute a new set which includes the random user and
his k-1 nearest neighbours. The second cloaking algorithm -
Hilbert Cloak (HC) satisfies reciprocity which is an important
property for spatial k-anonymity. Each user issues a query
with an anonymity degree which is associated to anonymising
set and spatial region. The HC provides privacy guarantees
under query distributions involving all users thereby providing
a formal guarantee for the anonymisation strength.
Another related work is [102], the authors look into applica-
tions that require frequent update from users. The anonymity
probability distribution is taken into consideration during the
computation of the cloaked region. They adopt the entropy of
information theory to compute the level of location anonymity.
They argue that k-anonymity protection is not guaranteed even
if the cloaking area contains k entities. The probability of the
users being in the cloaked region is considered in this approach
as they point out that the users have different weights in terms
of their contribution to the anonymity effect. They claim that
the cloaking region is a k-anonymity region if its entropy goes
beyond the level that is needed for k-anonymity protection.
To reduce the cloaking area and frequency of location up-
dates, a trajectory cloaking algorithm is proposed by [54]. The
trajectory cloaking algorithm is a depersonalizing time-series
sequences of location samples. They use historical data as
footprints to perform k-anonymity cloaking. A footprint is this
context is location sample of the user collected periodically.
The main objective of the proposed approach is to prevent an
adversary from degrading the quality of the current location
cloaking by taking advantage of the historical cloaked regions.
The authors in [37] consider the problem of continuous
queries from LBS. They point out that trace analysis attacks
are from linking historical cloaking regions with user mobility
patterns. They design two cloaking algorithms MaxAcc_Cloak
and MinComm_Cloak to control the generation of cloaking
regions. MaxAccCloak maximises the accuracy of the query
results while MinComm_Cloak is designed to reduce com-
munication cost. Finally, they use bulk and progressive query
processing modes to return query results in an incremental
manner.
The authors in [103] propose a traffic monitoring system
design which is based on the concept of virtual trip lines
(VTLs). VTLs are geographic markers stored in the user’s
mobile system. When a probe vehicle passes, VTLs trigger
a speed and location update. The authors claim that this
approach improves location privacy by restricting the VTL
server to follow a set of rules on the trip line placements. The
mobile device only generates updates in areas that are regarded
as less sensitive. Road categories are used to cloak temporal
information and VTL updates are sent probabilistically. The
proposed traffic monitoring system enables location privacy by
the separation of location and identity related processing. This
privacy by design methodology ensures that a single entity
does not have access to both streams of data.
An incremental clique-based cloaking algorithm (IClique-
Cloak) is proposed in [47] to defend against location depen-
dent attacks. They show that existing solutions are concerned
with the snapshot of user locations hence cannot effectively
prevent location dependent attacks. They adopt k-anonymity
and cloaking granularity as privacy metrics. The effects of
continuous location updates during location cloaking is incor-
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porated by ICliqueCloak. Their solution incrementally main-
tains the maximum cliques needed for location cloaking in
an undirected graph which considers the effects of continuous
location updates.
In [104], the authors propose a semantic tree-based algo-
rithm to generate social relationship among users when ob-
scured trajectories are provided. They model obscure regions
from the cloaking algorithm as a semantic region tree assign
weight values to regions based on their popularity. They use
a real trajectory dataset to show that their proposed approach
can identify ties successfully.
An enhanced location privacy scheme is proposed in [105].
In this approach, the LBS provider and the user carry out
a mutual transformation between the pseudo-location and
the real location. The spatial transformation is distributed
periodically by a function generator. Although a trusted entity
(anonymizer) is deployed, the authors claim that fully trusted
entities are not required to enhance location privacy.
4) Dummy-based techniques In Mobile Networks: The
main aim of the dummy technique is to protect the actual
location of the user by sending multiple false location in-
formation together with the actual position of the user to
the location server [106]. In this approach, users generate
false position data (dummies) that is sent along with the true
position of users to the service providers. They present two
dummy generating algorithms to protect the user’s privacy
from the service providers. The first algorithm is the Moving
in a Neighbourhood (MN) algorithm and the later is Moving
in a Limited Neighbourhood (MLN). The neighbourhood of
the current position of the dummy decides the next position
of the dummy in the MN approach while in the later ap-
proach, the next position of the dummy is also decided in
the neighbourhood but limited by the density of the region.
In addition to these dummy algorithms, they propose a cost
reduction technique to reduce the communication cost.
The monitoring of long term movement pattern of mobile
users can lead to the exposure of their trajectory path. The au-
thors in [107] argue that when a user’s trajectory is identified,
the location of the user is exposed. To protect the location
privacy of the user, they propose two techniques that generate
movement patterns that are inconsistent in a long run. The
random and rotational pattern schemes are used to generate
dummy trajectories which are based on the user’s profile.
While the random pattern generates dummies randomly with
consistent movement pattern, the rotational pattern creates
intersection among moving trajectories.
To guarantee location privacy in large regions, the authors
in [27] propose a Privacy-Area Aware Dummy-Based location
privacy (PAD). This approach offers privacy region guarantees.
PAD uses dummy locations that are created intentionally based
on a virtual grid or circle. This grid covers the actual location
of the user while their area is controlled by the algorithm
that created the dummy locations. The PAD approach uses
the front-end of the server side which is integrated into the
client/server mobile service system. To reduce the communi-
cation cost, a compact format is used to organise the query
results. This does not only reduce the communication cost
but also eases the refinement on the client side. The authors
also point out that k-anonymity does not guarantee location
privacy since it depends on the density and distribution of
mobile users. They suggest that the constraints in the privacy
area should be taken into consideration. PAD combines the
number of locations in a query sent to the server and the
area of the region which covers those locations. PAD offers
some level of granularity in location privacy since the dummy
generation algorithms are controllable and configurable.
The authors in [108] propose a privacy-aware monitoring
framework that deals with location updates and monitors the
system’s privacy, efficacy and accuracy at the same time. A
common interface is used in monitoring the different types
of spatial queries such as the kNN and range queries. There
is no assumption of the mobility pattern of users. The exact
position of the user is encapsulated in a bounding box which
makes the query results indistinguishable. This information is
updated to the server by the client-location updater.
A user-centric technique (DUMMY-Q) for privacy protec-
tion is proposed by [109]. This technique does not require
any trusted third-party and simply operates on the user side.
DUMMY-Q issues multiple counterfeit queries to confuse the
adversary about the user’s location. A dummy query gener-
ating algorithm called the pool-builder is used to randomly
select a set of dummy service attribute values which is the
set of locations assumed to be the user’s future snapshots of
the continuous LBS query. They also address the resource
limitations in mobile networks by using a quad-tree based
scheme to convert and store query information in binary form
to support efficient retrieval and achieve a high compression
ratio.
The authors in [110], [111] propose dummy-based privacy
preserving techniques which are based on assumptions that the
movement plan of the user is known in advance. In a more
realistic and refined approach [29], they propose a dummy-
based privacy preserving technique to anonymize the location
of users in real environments. They assume that a mobile
user pre-fetches the data map of his neighbourhood and the
registration ID of the user is shared with the dummies in the
LBS. When a LBS service request is initiated by the user,
dummies are generated around the user in the shape of a
grid to satisfy the requirement of the anonymous area. The
movement of dummies is based on the location of the user and
the geographical information which assures the requirement
of the anonymous area and decides the next location of the
dummies.
The authors in [30] combine spatial cloaking and dummy
based techniques to prevent privacy attacks. They make ob-
servations based on the trust on a location anonymizer which
may cause problem arising from a single point of failure.
Due to a system overhead issue, the authors try to minimize
the size of the cloaking region which may reveal the user’s
privacy. They propose an efficient privacy preserving scheme
DUMMY-T which generates a set of realistic dummy locations
for each snapshot. They use a path constructing algorithm
which guarantees location reachability by taking the maximum
distance of the moving mobile users into consideration.
5) Caching Schemes in Mobile Networks: The authors in
[112] propose a collaborative privacy scheme to enhance user
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location privacy in mobile services. In this scheme, mobile
users combine with each other to improve their privacy without
the need for a TTP. The mobile crowd acts as the TTP in this
context. Users minimize their location data by hiding in the
crowd. They develop and evaluate a scheme Mobicrowd that
enables users to reduce their exposure and hide in the crowd
while receiving location-based information. The develop an
analytical framework to evaluate the location privacy of the
proposed scheme in portable devices. This scheme uses an
untrusted LBS server for evaluation which makes it difficult
to guarantee the location privacy of the first user. Again the
cache hit ratio may be too low considering the fact that it is
related to the cache service information.
Similar to the approach proposed in [112], Mobicache is
proposed by [113] to provide k-anonymity and collaborative
content caching for user location privacy in mobile devices.
They focus on cache service information to improve the cache
hit ratio. They also introduce a dummy selection algorithm
(DSA) to select dummy locations from queried cells randomly
for users who send location request to untrusted LBS servers.
Furthermore, they harmonise the DSA to make more contri-
butions to the cache hit ratio by choosing locations.
The authors in [31] rigorously explore content caching
solutions to improve location privacy. They propose a caching-
aware dummy selection algorithm (Ca-DSA) to maximise
location privacy. CaDSA combines the dummy selection and
caching technique to enhance privacy. They consider the LBS
as an untrusted infrastructure with the motive of deducing
the location information of the user. Considering a more
comprehensive set of factors such as normalised distance and
the freshness of data, they propose an enhanced CaDSA to
maximise location privacy by determining the optimal set of
dummies for the cache hit ratio.
6) Coordinate Transformation in Mobile Networks: In
[114], a coordinate transformation approach is used to protect
user’s privacy. In a coordinate transformation approach, the
coordinates of any point in one coordinate system is converted
to coordinates of the same point in another coordinate system.
One single transformation function is shared by all users. This
approach is suitable for a trusted entity or closed group where
all members trust each other. The evaluation of each event is
limited to the relative position of members. It is not stated
whether a user can belong to two or more groups.
Another approach based on coordinate transformation is
proposed by [115]. In this approach, simple geometric opera-
tions are performed by mobile users before sending them to
the location server. To restore the original position, the trans-
formation function is distributed among clients. On the other
hand, it is impossible to match the positions of the different
users that were obfuscated with different transformations such
as performing range queries.
7) Information Access Control in Mobile Networks: In
this approach, the locations of the user are sent to the LBS
provider. Rule-based policies are used to restrict access to
the stored location data by the LBS provider. Three types
of location-based queries are supported by this approach;
user location queries, enumeration queries and asynchronous
queries. The user location query is used for querying a
specific user’s location identified by their unique ID while the
enumeration query queries the list of users at specific locations
which are expressed as symbolic or geometric attributes.
The asynchronous queries are used for querying the event
information such as the entry and exit of users in specific
areas. The LBS maintains all the locations of the user in this
technique [116], [117].
A location-based access control (LBAC) policy is presented
in [118]. LBS is integrated with a generic access control model
to enable the location-based credentials of the user requesting
for the LBS services to be validated. In this approach, a service
level agreement is formulated based on temporal validity of
each access request and the notion of confidence level. The
authors claim that LBAC can be applied to a broad variety
of policies in LBS. However, they still point out some issues
concerning the specification and enforcement of security and
privacy constraints on location-based information.
In [119], an access control policy is extended to incorporate
the concepts of LBS. They point out that locations can be
specified at different levels of granularity. The role of the user
is used to determine if the user has access to some resources.
They also identify the constraints imposed by some role-based
entities on access control such as the dynamic separation of
duties and role hierarchy.
Another location-based access control scheme is presented
in [52] to protect the location privacy of users. They categorize
privacy in LBS into identity, position and path privacy. They
introduce the notion of relevance to accommodate peculiar
characteristics of privacy-aware LBS. This approach is com-
bined with a location obfuscation technique and it allows users
to manage their privacy preferences for specific purposes and
applications.
An access control model (GEO-RBAC) designed for mili-
tary environment is proposed in [120]. Although GEO-RBAC
is developed specifically to address stringent security require-
ments, the location privacy of the user is also protected with
the integration of an access control system that provides
trusted location data. GEO-RBAC provides trustworthy loca-
tion information by ensuring that location privacy is authenti-
cated with high level of assurance. To ensure secure location
identification, several issues including availability, usability
and strong location assurance are addressed. However, one
major limitation of this approach is that it makes use of near
field communication (NFC) communication which is an RFID-
based proximity-constrained technology with a very limited
broadcast range of about 10m. We summarize the privacy
enhancing schemes for mobile networks proposed in literature
in Table III & IV.
B. Cryptographic-based Approaches
1) Private Information Retrieval (PIR): To support private
location dependent queries, a novel framework is proposed by
[121]. In this approach, privacy is achieved using a crypto-
graphic technique and no trusted third-party is required. They
provide privacy guarantees against correlation attacks. They
develop algorithms for exact and approximate private NN
search and the query execution is optimized by data mining.
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TABLE III: Summary of Privacy Enhancing Schemes that address Location Privacy in Mobile Services
Category Strategy Privacy Metric Infrastructure
Requirements
Location Privacy attack
addressed
Issues Addressed
Mix Zone Beresford et . al. [60] Anonymity set 1 Trace analysis and corre-
lation attacks
Makes it difficult for users to be tracked along their
trajectories.
Mix Zone Freudiger et . al. [50] Location Tracking 2 Tracking success Uses a mix zone deployment strategy and an opti-
mized algorithm to improve location privacy.
Mix Zone MobiMix [42] Entropy & anonymity set
size
1 Transition & timing at-
tacks
Uses a set of mix zone placement algorithms and
constructions to user provide privacy.
Obfuscation Duckham et . al. [93] Size of obfuscation set 1 N/A Provides a formal framework that defines obfus-
cated LBS.
Obfuscation [94] Relevance 1 Deobfuscation attacks Allow users to express their privacy preferences
intuitively.
Obfuscation Patching & delaying [28] Imprecise location-based
range query
2 Inference attacks Uses imprecise queries to hide the identity of the
issuer of the query and enable the evaluation of
cloaked information.
Obfuscation Shokri et . al. [55] Distortion-based metric N/A Reconstruction attacks Estimates the user’s location privacy as the level of
distortion in his actual trace reconstructed by the
reversal of privacy preserving mechanisms.
Cloaking IntervalCloak [40] Anonymity set size 1 Location tracking attacks The resolution of the location-based information is
adjusted to meet specified anonymity constraints
within a region.
Cloaking CliqueCloak [96] Success rate & relative
anonymity level
2 linking attacks Enables mobile clients to specify their minimum
anonymity level and maximum spatial & temporal
tolerance level when requesting for LBS services.
Cloaking P2P Spatial Cloaking [97] Anonymity set size 2 N/A A mobile node forms a group of peers before re-
questing for LBS using single or multi-hop routing.
Cloaking Casper [46] Anonymity set size 3 N/A Casper is a TTP application that enables users
to register a specified privacy profile, a location
anonymizer is used to blur the exact location of
the mobile user into a cloaked area.
Cloaking iPDA [98] Entropy 1 Trace analysis attacks Uses an optimal mobility-aware cloaking technique
to prevent trace analysis attacks.
Cloaking Chow et . al. [32] Continuous Queries &
cloaked spatial region
area
1 Query sampling and
query tracking attack
Uses a spatial cloaking technique to to distinguish
between location and query privacy.
Cloaking Prive [99] Anonymity set size 2 Inference attacks Prive is a decentralised system for query anonymi-
sation , it guarantees anonymity under any user
distribution.
Cloaking Bettini et al. [53] Anonymity set 1 Inference attacks Identification of the potential classes of attackers
and a formal framework for privacy preservation
based on the level of privacy defined by the user.
Cloaking PRIVACYGRID [100] anonymisation success
rate & Relative
anonymity and relative
diversity levels
3 Inference attacks PRIVACYGRID allows users to define their privacy
requirements with regards to controlling the pro-
cessing of queries and hiding their locations.
Cloaking Hu et al. [101] Anonymity set size 2 Correlation attacks Cluster-isolated (t-connectivity and
k − clustering) algorithms are used to define the
privacy profiles of users.
Cloaking NNC & HC [45] Anonymity set size 2 Inference attacks Spatial queries are processed using a prohibitive
linear computation.
A hybrid approach for private location-based query is pro-
posed by [122]. This approach protects the user and the LBS
database. They provide a strong privacy by generalizing the
user location to coarse-grained cloaked regions and apply a
PIR protocol to the queries from the cloaked region. Two
cryptographic protocols are used to protect the users against
imprudent disclosure of the POI locations. To efficiently sup-
port PIR, two algorithms are introduced to provide solutions
for exact and approximate NN queries.
The authors in [123], [124] propose major performance
improvements to the approaches in [121], [122]. The mobile
users use an oblivious transfer method to determine their
position within the grid. The user’s ID and the associated
symmetric key for the block of data are contained in the
transfer. A communication efficient PIR is executed is exe-
cuted by the user in the private grid to retrieve the appropriate
block. The symmetrical key obtained in the previous stage is
used to decrypt this block. Authors claim that their approach
provides protection for the user and the server since the server
cannot determine the location of the user. The data of the
server is also protected since an attacker can only decrypt the
data block from the PIR using the encryption key from the
previous stage. Based on a fixed number of nearest neighbours
k, [125] look into query privacy using a Rabin crypto-system
to prevent mobile users from retrieving more than one data
per query. They allow LBS queries based on the location and
single POI type attribute only. They assume that mobile users
can get location from satellites anonymously and there is an
anonymous channel for the mobile user to send queries and
services from the LBS provider. The propose three algorithms
(query generation, response generation and response retrieval)
to provide location privacy for the user against the LBS
provider.
Opposed to the approach in [125], the authors in [126]
argue that queries with multiple POI type attributes are not
supported in this approach. They study the kNN queries where
the users queries the LBS provider about the k nearest POIs
using his current location. They propose a solution built on
the Paillier public-key crypto system which can provide both
query and location privacy. This approach allows users to
retrieve one type of POIs such as approximate k nearest car
parks without revealing the POI that is retrieved to the LBS
provider. They use RSA to provide data privacy and support
sequential queries. For private location-based queries, they add
a generic solution with multiple attribute types.
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TABLE IV: Summary of Privacy Enhancing Schemes that address Location Privacy in Mobile Services CONTD.
Category Strategy Privacy Metric Location Privacy attack
addressed
Issues Addressed
Cloaking Xu et al . [102] Entropy N/A Entropy is used to measure the degree of
anonymity of a cloaked region with high
QoS guaranteed.
Cloaking Xu et al . [54] Anonymity set size Trajectory attacks Ensures anonymity by providing k-
anonymity trajectory protection when a
user requests for LBS services.
Cloaking MaxAccu &
MinComm_Cloak
[37]
Entropy Trace analysis attacks The mobility-aware algorithms improve the
quality of location cloaking without com-
promising much on the communication
cost.
Cloaking VTL [103] Time-to-confusion & distance-
to-confusion
Trace analysis attacks The identity of the user is hidden from
external traffic monitoring server using geo-
graphic markers and an associated cloaking
technique.
Cloaking ICliqueCloak [47] Entropy k anonymity & cloak-
ing granularity
Location Dependent at-
tacks
An undirected graph is used to maintain the
maximum number of cliques required for
location cloaking.
Cloaking Peng et . al . Success rate Inference attacks Uses a function generator in the distribu-
tion of spatial transformation between LBS
providers and users.
Dummy MN & MLN [106] Anonymity set N/A Location data is made indistinguishable by
generating false location data.
Dummy You et al . [107] Anonymity set Location tracking Dummies are inserted into the users trajec-
tories based on their privacy profiles.
Dummy PAD [27] Anonymity set Inference attacks PAD ensured region based privacy and also
reduces communication cost.
Dummy DUMMY-Q [109] Query success rate Snapshot attack A pool builder is used to query dummies
based on the query context information.
Dummy Hara et . al . [29] Anonymity set Inference attacks Dummies are generated to anonymise the
user location within a range that is prede-
termined.
Dummy Dummy-T [30] Entropy Inference attacks Historical data is protected from adver-
saries with background information using
dummy generating algorithm.
Caching Scheme Mobicrowd [112] Expected estimation error Bayesian Inference at-
tacks
Hides a fraction of the LBS queries to
enhance the location privacy of the users.
Caching Scheme MobiCache [113] Entropy & cache hit ratio Location information at-
tack
Combines DSA with cache scheme to im-
prove location privacy.
Caching Scheme CaDSA [31] Average uncertainty Inference attacks Combines k-anonymity, caching and side
information to achieve location privacy.
Coordinate
Transformation
Treu et . al . [114] Position and range queries Trace analysis Attempts to protect location information
of mobile users against untrusted LBS
providers. The authors admit that the pro-
posed scheme provides a relatively protec-
tion.
2) Location Proof: A location-based authentication mech-
anism is proposed in [127]. This mechanism generates loca-
tion signatures from the reception of raw GPS signals from
satellites. Authors claim that the location signatures are very
difficult to forge based on the variation of the received signals.
In [128], a system that can securely provide location privacy
for mobile devices is presented. They design a protocol that
computes the proximity of the mobile device to the location
of the network. This protocol is developed by computing the
round-trip signal propagation latency and it is able to preserve
the identity of the mobile user and the verifier.
A trusted geo-tagging service is proposed for location
privacy mobile services [129]. This approach specifically tags
the content with trusted locations and the time-stamp meta-
data. They use content hashes to protect the content from
modification by adversaries. The main function of the location
proof in this approach is to identify the location of end users
while the geo-tagging services add trusted location information
to the contents.
In [130], a secure location proof is proposed for mobile
users’ location privacy. In this approach, mobile users and
wireless Access Points (APs) exchange their public keys which
have been signed. This is done to create time-stamped location
proofs. They assume that wireless infrastructures such as WiFi
or cell towers handle location proofs as such mobile users are
capable of proving present and past location information.
The authors in [131] propose a location proof architecture
with collision resiliency and location privacy protection. The
proposed system requires three different trusted entities to
provide privacy and security: a CDA (Cheating Detection Au-
thority), a TTPL (Trusted Third-Party for managing Location
information) and TTPU (Trusted Third-Party for managing
User information). Each of the trusted entities has access to
only one attribute, i.e either the either the user’s location
or its identity. They introduce a collision detection scheme
(Veriplace) which works only when location proofs are re-
quested by user frequently.
To provide location privacy for mobile services, the authors
in [132] propose a scheme which relies on wireless APs for
location proofs and also witness endorsement from mobile
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peers with enabled bluetooth services. This is done to prevent
the forgery of location proofs by adversaries without colliding
with other users. In this approach, the necessity of the mul-
tiple trusted parties is eliminated with two privacy preserving
techniques (hash chains and bloom filters) for protecting the
integrity of the location proofs chronologically.
In [133], an alibi privacy preserving system is proposed.
This approach relies on the proximity of mobile users to
create location proofs (alibi) for each other. The identity of
the user is concealed during the creation of the location proof
and revealed only when the alibi is presented to a judge.
They develop a cryptographic commitment scheme to provide
security and privacy of the alibi system by creating owner
statements from the owner features in the verification section
of the alibi privacy preserving scheme.
In [33], co-located bluetooth devices generate location proof
and update it to a location server. Pseudonyms changed
periodically to protect the source location information from
each other. To protect the location of the users, the private
information is distributed to the three entities involved in the
LBS: the verifier, the location proof server and the CA. They
claim that the user location privacy is guaranteed from every
party. Users can also evaluate their real-time privacy levels
from the user-centric location privacy model and decide when
to accept location proof request based on their location privacy
levels.
A Spatial-Temporal provenance Assurance with Mutual
Proofs (STAMP) scheme is proposed by [134]. This scheme
is based on a distributed architecture where ad-hoc mobile
users generate location proofs for each other. The authors
claim that STAMP ensures the non-transferability and integrity
of location proofs and users are in control of the location
granularity of their spatial-temporal provenance proofs. They
integrate the distant bounding protocol into the proposed
scheme to prevent users from collecting location proof on
behalf of another user. A trust model based on entropy is
developed to prevent generation of fake proofs and prover-
witness collusions.
3) Key Management: In [135], the authors use a simple
public-key cryptography to control access to location informa-
tion. This proxy-based approach uses a Location Information
Preference Authority (LIPA) as a trusted party to examine
the constrains chosen by the user and make decisions on the
distribution of location information. They use an online loca-
tion gatherer to construct tokens for the location information.
This token contains the location information and constraints
encrypted with the public key of LIPA. The location gatherer
digitally signs the information to provide access control. The
LBS receives a token when requesting for access, this is
followed by the signature verification and establishment of
the location information subjects. The token is then submitted
to LIPA to verify that the LBS requesting for the service has
access to the location information requested.
The authors in [136] extend the logical key hierarchy (LKH)
[137] scheme where the key distribution centre maintains a
tree of keys to support encryption of location information at
multiple levels. They present a framework that enables users
to share their location information with different levels of
user control which is integrated into LBS. They present some
techniques to support hierarchical dissemination of location
information by encrypting the location information with dif-
ferent keys and distributing them to the appropriate members
while maintaining location privacy.
In [138], authors propose a scalable key management al-
gorithm for LBS. First, they develop an efficient, secure and
scalable key management protocol STauth for LBS. STauth
reduces the number of keys that need to be distributed. They
exploit the 3-dimensional spatial-temporal authorization model
to construct authorization keys using hierarchical key graphs.
We summarize the cryptographic approaches proposed in
literature in Table V.
VI. DRAWBACKS OF PROPOSED SCHEMES
A. Location Privacy Schemes
In this section, we summarize the weaknesses of location
privacy approaches in vehicular and mobile networks. Mix
zones rely on a set of predefined spatial region for pseudonym
exchange. In low density areas, these approaches suffer from
low privacy protection which implies that location privacy
cannot be guaranteed. In [60], the proposed approach requires
careful control of the number of users within the mix-zone,
which is difficult to achieve in practice. In a scenario where an
adversary monitors more than 50% of the road intersections,
location privacy is not guaranteed [57]. The mix zone approach
in [62], [63] provides vehicles with pseudonyms which are
changed at social spots. The assumption that a social spot is
continuously available to change pseudonyms is not always
the case. The assumption is not applicable in a highway
where there is low density of vehicles at road intersections
or assumed social spots. The unlinkability of users’ queries
is limited when the size of the mix zone is kept small. The
success rate of an adversary is still relatively high even if the
mix zones are optimally placed [50]. The authors in [64] argue
that if vehicles change pseudonym in inappropriate events, the
location privacy of these vehicles are not protected by mix
zones concept.
In [57], the silent period contradicts the main objective
of vehicular communications. Refraining from broadcasting
safety messages during silent periods can result in a neg-
ative QoE for LBS users. Random silence periods are still
susceptible to traffic analysis attacks. Adversaries use prior
state of targeted vehicles to link vehicles during silent periods.
In silent periods, there is a possibility of tracking vehicles
by deducing their spatial and temporal correlation as a result
of the maximum silent period being constrained [64]. In
[139], the authors point out that even when vehicles change
their pseudonyms simultaneously after the silent period, the
complete trajectory can be reconstructed.
Cacheclock [70] relies on a centralised anonymity server.
If this third-party server is compromised, the actual user
trajectory can easily be identified when there are no other
users in the predicted path. In MobiCache [113], an adversary
can use side information to deduce location information of a
targeted user. Cloaking approaches provide effective location
privacy when the LBS server is not queried so often. A user
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TABLE V: Summary of Cryptographic Schemes that address Location Privacy in Mobile Networks
Category Strategy Privacy Metric Location Privacy at-
tack addressed
Issues Addressed
PIR Nearest neighbour et
al. [121]
K-degree of anonymity Correlation attacks Nearest neighbour approximation using
Hilbert ordering and cloaking region.
PIR Nearest neighbour
[122]
Communication cost&
overhead
User identity disclosure User location is generalised into coarse
grained regions and provides protection for
both the users and the database. & vehicle
density.
PIR Oblivious transfer &
PIR [124], [123]
Performance based
on communication
efficiency
User identity disclosure Privacy-preserving location data query and
acquisition
PIR k nearest neighbours
[61]
Computation complexity
& communication over-
head
Location and data pri-
vacy
LBS allows user retrieve location informa-
tion based on user request.
PIR k nearest neighbours
[126]
Computation complexity
& communication over-
head
Query and location pri-
vacy
Location information retrieval based on
user-specific request.
Location proof Variation of received
signals et . al. [127]
Protection against loca-
tion forging attacks
Location data are generated based on vary-
ing GPS data from aerial satellites.
Location proof Brent and Edward
[128]
Formal proof Integrity and privacy
protection
Location proof is based on triangulation by
third-party location verifiers.
Location proof Trust-based location
content provisioning
[129]
System is based on a PKI
infrastructure
Privacy protection and
protection against loca-
tion forging and modifi-
cation.
Contents with trusted location information
are geo-tagged for later retrieval
Location proof Saroiu & Wolman
[130]
NA Collusion attacks Addresses collusion attacks using hard-to-
forge personal information.
Location proof VeriPlace [131] Protocol evaluation
through simulations
Protection against loca-
tion cheating, and de-
fence against wormhole
attacks
Design of an architecture enables users to
collect proofs for being at a location.
Location proof Hasan and Burns [132] Percentage of revealed
location information
Protection against tam-
pering and collusion at-
tacks by malicious users
Use of bloom filters and hash chain based
systems for location provenance.
Location proof Alibi system [133] Validated on an Android
platform
Sybil-alibi attack Addresses a privacy-preserving alibi mech-
anism that conceals user identity during
alibi creation.
Location proof APPLAUS [33] Various performance pa-
rameters (e.g. overhead
ratio)
Collusion resistant loca-
tion privacy
Use of periodically(statistically) changing
pseudonyms for privacy protection.
Location proof STAMP [134] Various performance
metrics (e.g. entropy
and collusion-detection
accuracy)
Collusion attacks Ad-hoc mobile users generate location
proofs for each other in a distributed set-
ting.
Key management Gajparia et al. [135] Re-keying efficiency (e.g.
re-keying overhead)
NA Hierarchical encryption of location infor-
mation based on group membership.
Key management Sun et al. [136] Message delivery and key
management overhead
NA Based on providing keys to group mem-
bers that allow them to decrypt location
information for their use.
Key management STauth [138] Throughput & response
time
Denial of Service at-
tacks
Explots spatio-temporal authorisation
model to construct secure hierarchical key
graphs
can be exposed if a server is queried frequently over time.
Assuming one of the k users in the spatial area is inconsistent
throughout the set of cloaked request, the location privacy of
that user is not guaranteed. In a centralized location cloaking
approach such as [121], the major drawback is the anonymizer
which acts as a proxy between users and the LBS server per
query. This process creates a single point of attack and failure.
In Spatial cloaking approach [32], the anonymity server may
generate very large cloaked area resulting in performance
degradation. This is as a result of the mobility of users in
the k-region who are in the same cloaked area but move in
different directions. Location cloaking has been very effective
against adversaries with background knowledge. However,
constructing cloaking regions and receiving responses from
the LBS server will lead to network degradation. It becomes
a bottleneck since all the submitted queries go through the
server. In [106] and [93], the location privacy threats are even
more significant. This is because the LBS server knows the
precise location of the user which is given in the anonymity
set. The real location of the user can be revealed by monitoring
a sequence of queries. In location cloaking, when a large
anonymity set is formed, it increases the communication cost
between users. Again one general assumption that is made in
this approach is that all users registered for this service are
trusted in order to form the cloaked region.
In dummy-based approaches, realistic locations are not
considered when generating the dummies or trajectories. Based
on the location where the dummy is generated, the LBS
provider can easily filter out the location. Dummy queries
confuse adversaries that target a user location, implementing
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an optimal solution for generating dummy queries remains an
open problem. In [31], the caching scheme is combined with
a dummy selection algorithm to provide location privacy. This
approach requires the cooperation of LBS participants or users.
B. Cryptographic Approaches
The authentication schemes [77], [85], [79] that provide
location privacy pay more attention to optimising the com-
munication cost. These schemes focus on the authentication
of messages in a timely manner. If invalid messages exist, an
additional overhead may be introduced as a result of the delay
in verification. In TACKs [23], vehicles are authenticated by
the registration authority with a short life time. This region-
based certificates issued by the registration authority have a
short life time and only valid within the region covered by
the registration authority. IEEE standards for Wireless Access
in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [140] requires vehicles
to periodically broadcast their location, direction and speed at
every 100−300sec. Privacy preserving authentication schemes
such as TACKs [23] are not suitable for safety applications in
VANETs. This scheme requires the registration authority to
delay for sometime before sending a certificate to a vehicle
requesting for service updates [141]. In RAISE [85], vehicles
have to store a large number private and public keys as
well as their corresponding certificates. In areas with high
density of vehicles, it will be difficult for the RSU to transmit
many certificates in addition to other services it provides.
The PIR techniques guarantee perfect privacy and support
for partial queries. However, their major weakness is the
computational complexity and high computational overhead
it incurs [121]. Another drawback in PIRs is their reliance on
hardware with a limited secure coprocessor and computational
power. One advantage of the PIR scheme is that it does not
require a TTP server. It uses a cryptographic technique to
provide location privacy. The question whether LBS queries
can be performed over encrypted data still raises issues. Many
approaches have been proposed for security and privacy in
vehicular networks. However, there are still several challenges
that need to be addressed before the realization of connected
cars and autonomous driving. One major problem identified is
how to keep a balance between security and privacy. CRL is
used basically for the revocation of malicious users. Although
caching techniques have been combined with hashing tech-
niques to improve the availability of revocation services, the
privacy information of the user can be compromised during
the process of checking the certificate status. The privacy
preserving authentication schemes can expose the user to
adversaries. Authentication may expose the precise location
of a user in real time to TTP to ensure that it intervenes
when an issue arises. Drivers may not want to be monitored
by TTPs since it violates their privacy. However, this will be
different for connected and autonomous cars as data will be
recorded using event data recorders. As vehicles are expected
to report their routes, efficient data aggregation techniques
must be implemented without leaking any private information
of the vehicles.
VII. OPEN ISSUES
In the previous sections, we reviewed several approaches to
enhance location privacy. We also identified several challenges.
One major challenge regarding the protection of location data
of users is the trade off between security and privacy. The
complete realisation of smart transportation which includes
connected and connected autonomous vehicles could lead to
critical changes in driving experience by the integration of
smartness into ITS applications [142]. This raises a huge
privacy concern because of the periodic beaconing information
about the network. We discuss some of these challenges below.
• A major issue in location privacy techniques is the
measure of the effectiveness of location privacy. Different
privacy metrics have been discussed in Section III which
are used in the context of mobile and vehicular networks.
Privacy metrics such as entropy can be difficult to com-
pute and this raises a question about its suitability for
practical applications. Although so many metrics have
been proposed for location privacy, most of them have
either been validated with limited simulations or just
proposed mathematical theories. There are no standard
metrics, validation tool or methodology that have been
adopted to validate the level of privacy provided by
proposed schemes. As pointed out in [20], there should
be a comprehensive study that highlights the suitability
of these metrics to specific scenarios.
• Another key area is the evaluation of the impact of these
privacy enhancing technologies on safety applications.
For example, in disaster stricken areas such as the recently
witnessed Hurricane Harvey [143] where over half a
million vehicles were destroyed as a result of the flooding.
Safety application should be able to make real time
decisions such as warning the users of upcoming dan-
gers. For vehicular networks, these messages are always
transmitted using beacons. If a privacy enhancing scheme
such as silent period discussed in section IV is used, this
interruption could result in a delay in the broadcast of
real-time safety information.
• Very little work has been done on pseudonym revo-
cation. There are questions regarding the issuance and
management of pseudonyms. For example, if a user
is compromised and its pseudonym is revoked, it can
still use other pseudonyms to provide privacy. If all the
certificates are revoked, it is not clear how is this process
controlled by the authorities taking into consideration the
impacts of the revocation of a user’s identity.
• Location privacy enhancing schemes that are based on
k-anonymisation, cloaking and obfuscation usually in-
troduce a trade-off between privacy and accuracy and
most services may require real-time location information
especially in modern tracking applications. In mobile
networks, there are significant numbers of TTPs which
are assumed as trusted entities and these TTPs process
location updates. In situation where an adversary can
access the data from the TTP, the user’s location data
is compromised.
• The collection of location data is necessary for nav-
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igational purposes especially for smart transportation.
However, there is a growing concern about the collec-
tion of sensitive location data and the risk of harm.
For example, revealing an individual’s historical location
and destination information which may reveal sensitive
information about the individual based on real time traffic
data and points of interest along the individual’s planned
route. Location privacy can be violated by combining the
location information with personal information about the
user for marketing purposes. Based on inference drawn
from the location data of a vehicle, data privacy may be
violated through customized advertising.
• There is need for transparency and control over the use
and sharing of location data. It is not very clear how this
data will be used, shared and who has the right to control
data. Location data is recognised as one of the identifiers
of personal data in Article 4(1) of the GDPR [144]. There
is still an uncertainty about sensitive location data. It is
not clear how the consent granularity proposed in Article
(9) of the GDPR [145] will deal with privacy violations.
• Although software in vehicles is not a new development,
there were no connectivities between vehicles. An average
vehicle today has up to 100 Electronic Control Units
[ECUs] for monitoring and controlling of the electronic
system. The authors in [146] identified several malwares
in the form of executable codes in connected vehicles as a
result of complex interdependencies. This means that the
software in a vehicle has some substantial number of bugs
and these may be more acute with additional software.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we presented a comprehensive review of
location privacy in LBS. We described and discussed security
and location privacy requirements in vehicular and mobile
networks. We introduced a taxonomy along the dimensions
of privacy metrics, adversary models and compared a large
number of recent publications. We categorised the current
research into two groups: privacy enhancing schemes and
cryptographic approaches for location privacy in vehicular and
mobile networks We further identified the challenges and open
issues in location privacy for vehicular and mobile networks.
We identified and discussed four categories of location privacy
enhancing schemes in vehicular networks. We also looked at
two categories of privacy preserving authentication schemes
that address location privacy in vehicular networks. In mobile
networks, we described five categories of privacy enhancing
schemes and three cryptographic approaches that address loca-
tion privacy. To the best of our knowledge, this survey provides
a comprehensive overview of privacy enhancing schemes and
cryptograhic solutions that address location privacy.
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